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IN THE S U P R E M E COURT
O F THE STATE O F UTAH

ROSS WANGSGARD,
Plaintiff-A

ppellant,

vs.
PEGGY FITZPATRICK, WILLIAM
LENCE, THOMAS R. MATHEWS,
and BONNIE J. MATHEWS,
his wife,
Defendants-Respondents

Case
No.
13890

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages which the
plaintiff alleges he sustained when the defendants
forcibly entered certain real property located at 368
South Main Street, Park City, Utah. Plaintiff further
alleges the defendants wrongfully evicted him from
the said premises by ousting he and one Marvin Ryan
to whom the plaintiff had subleased a portion of the
premises; and by changing the locks on the door of
the premises. [See complaint R. 105-109].
1
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter was originally set for Jury trial on
October 9, 1974. [R. 1181. After all of the parties,
counsel and the jury had appeared, counsel for the
defendants made a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds it failed to state a cause of action in
that the plaintiff had no standing under the laws of
Utah to bring the action. [R. 119]. Both parties made
a substantial oral argument at that time [R. 119-127];
after which the court took the matter under advisement, dismissed the jury, and asked both counsel to
file simultaneous briefs dealing with their respective
positions. [R. 127-129]. Thereafter, the defendants
filed their Memorandum In Support of Their Motion
To Dismiss [R. 2-7]; and the plaintiff filed his Memorandum In Opposition To the Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss. [R. 110-117]. After reviewing these written
memorandam, the court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. [R. 74-a, 74-bL
The case was then reset for jury trial to commence November 6, 1974 [R. 73, 130]; whereupon
a two-day jury trial was held November 6, and 7,
1974. [R. 130-326]. During this time, the defendants
again renewed their motion to dismiss which was
taken under advisement. [R. 215]. The court subsequently granted a motion for Summary Judgment
after both sides rested. [R. 329-336]. This judgment
was signed on November 12, 1974. [R. 14-15]. The
plaintiff thereafter filed his notice of appeal on
November 15, 1974. [R. 13].
2
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks the following relief: (1) to
reverse the decision of the Honorable Marcellus K.
Snow in granting the respondents' motion for summary judgment, (2) to find and so order that all
respondents were guilty of both a forcible entry and
wrongful eviction of the appellant Ross Wangsgard,
(3) to remand this case for a new trial on the issue
of damages only, and (4) in the event this court
remands the entire case for a new trial on all issues
then the appellant also requests a ruling from this
court as to the admissibility of certain real property
leasehold agreements and as to testimony from the
landlord.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March, 1971, the plaintiff and one Gene Mayfield entered into a joint venture to operate a bar
business known as the BLACKOUT located at 368
South Main Street, Park City, Utah. [R. 134]. Mr.
Mayfield had previously lived in California, had
moved to Utah, and was interested in finding employment. [R. 134]. He contacted the plaintiff about conducting the BLACKOUT business in Park City. The
plaintiff agreed to advance the necessary finances for
their initial investment; and Mr. Mayfield agreed
to conduct the actual operation of the business. [R.
134]. Prior to this time, the BLACKOUT business
was being run by one E. B. Cooksey and/or his
3
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corporation known as The Silver Park Limited. [Ex.
12-P, R. 174].
On March 17, 1971, the plaintiff and Gene Mayfield entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer To Purchase the said BLACKOUT business from
Mr. Cooksey. [Ex. 12-PL The sale was handled by
Imperial Realty Company. [Ex. 12-P, R. 174]. The
sale was consummated on March 26, 1971, when the
said plaintiff and Mayfield paid $9,650.00 for the
purchase of the business. [Ex. 13-P, R. 174]. Approximately $2,000 was paid down and a balance of
$7,650 was financed in a Title Retaining Promissory
Note bearing date of March 25, 1971, and calling
for monthly payments of $250.70. [Ex. 8-P, R. 134].
Concurrent with the purchase of the business
from Mr. Cooksey, the plaintiff and Mayfield also
entered into an ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE whereby
Mr. Cooksey assigned all of the interest he had in
and to the real property at 368 South Main Street,
Park City, Utah, to Gene Mayfield and Ross Wangsgard. [Ex. 7-P, R. 133-135]. This ASSIGNMENT
OF LEASE was executed by the plaintiff, Mayfield,
Cooksey, and three other men who were the landlords and who owned the premises: Robert E.
McConaughy III, Walker M. Wallace, and John M.
Wallace. [Ex. 7-P, R. 2 ] .
This ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE referred to certain underlying documents, to-wit: REAL PROPERTY
LEASE [Ex. 5-P] and AMENDMENT
OF REAL
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PROPERTY LEASE [Ex. 6-PL The defendants objected to Exhibits 5-P, 6-P and 7-P being received in
evidence: and the court took the objection under
advisement. [R. 133-139]. The plaintiff sought repeatedly to introduce testimony as to the plaintiff's
status under the leases; but each time the court took
the matter under advisement or sustained objections
to the testimony. [R. 133-139, 179, 308-312]. Finally
and after extensive further oral argument by counsel,
[R. 204-220], the trial judge sustained the defendant's
objections to Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P. [R. 221].
Thereafter, the plaintiff made an offer of proof
pursuant to Rule 43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as to the admissability of Exhibits 5-P, 6-P
and 7-P. [R. 223]. Because of this offer of proof, the
plaintiff is referring to these exhibits and the testimony concerning these exhibits in this brief.
After the lease agreements were executed, the
plaintiff and Gene Mayfield entered onto the premises
at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and began
to operate the BLACKOUT business. [R. 140].
Approximately one to three months after they entered
onto the premises, the plaintiff purchased some pool
tables, juke boxes, pinball machines, and cigarette
machines at a cost of approximately $5,000 and put
these on the premises. [R. 141, 252]. These items are
referred to in the testimony as recreational or amusement items as opposed to the bar equipment which
was being purchased from Mr. Cooksey.
Approximately one year after they commenced
the business, Gene Mayfield had another business
5
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opportunity- and the plaintiff purchased all of Mayfield's interest in the real property leases and the
other items of personal property and trade equipment.
[R. 141-142]. Mr. Mayfield executed a BILL OF
SALE dated May 27, 1972, and an ASSIGNMENT
OF INTEREST IN LEASE in connection with this
transaction. [Ex. 11-P, 9-P, R. 141-142, 173]. Therefore, after May of 1972, the plaintiff was the only
person who had any interest in the real property lease
or in the personal property or trade equipment on the
premises at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah.
The plaintiff made all of his rental payments to the
landlords and operated the business himself personally through January, 1973. [R. 143]. During this
period of time, the plaintiff realized an annual profit
of $5,000 from the bar business and an additional
$5,000 from the recreational or amusement items.
[R. 144].
During the latter part of 1972, the plaintiff
decided to sell the BLACKOUT business and to retain
only his interest in the recreational items. [R. 145].
This decision was based on several factors: the plaintiff had met his present wife about this time and
planned a marriage for April, 1973. This prompted
a desire to spend more time with his family of four
teenage sons. He also had four eye operations that
were needed in the coming year. Finally, he had
experienced some problems with employees and some
unexplained disappearances of money. Based upon all
these factors, he decided to sell the BLACKOUT
business. [R. 145,235].
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He listed the business with Imperial Realty Company at a price of $10,000. [Ex. 8-P, R. 1461. He
did not include the amusement or recreational items
in the sale because he was making a good profit on
them for the investment he incurred. [R. 146]. Moreover, since he was willing to sell the bar business on
a contract, he felt he should make frequent trips to
Park City, to insure his investment in the bar equipment was not being wasted. [R. 1461. So, since he
was going there anyway to protect his investment, it
was a simple matter for him to maintain his amusement or recreational machines. [R. 146].
One Marvin Ryan had been plaintiffs manager
in the operation of the BLACKOUT business. During
January, 1973, Mr. Ryan and the plaintiff agreed
to a purchase and sale of the business at a price of
$10,000.00. [R. 147-148]. As stated, the sale did not
include the recreational or amusement items. Mr.
Ryan was to pay the $10,000 for the business at the
rate of $300 per month. In addition, he was to pay
all utilities and to pay the monthly rental due under
the lease agreements. [R. 181 ]. Mr. Ryan was to take
possession of the property on February 1, 1973. [R.
177]. The plaintiff retained the title to all of the bar
equipment until the full purchase price was paid
because no down payment was made. [R. 177-178].
The plaintiff testified Mr. Ryan was going to operate
the business for two to six months; and if Ryan could
get in a profitable financial condition, there would be
a formal written contract pertaining to the $10,000.00
purchase price. [R. 178]. The contract was never
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formalized; and Mr. Ryan died in approximately
November, 1973. [R. 178]. The defendant William
Lence testified that Ryan told him there was no
intent on Ryan's part to purchase the items because
Ryan felt the price was too high and the tourist season
was about over. [R. 275].
The landlord sold the premises at 368 South
Main Street, Park City, Utah, to the defendants
Mathews on March 28, 1973. [Ex. 4-D, R. 311]. The
sale was on a Uniform Real Estate Contract in which
the seller retained title until the full purchase price
was paid. [See paragraph 18 of Ex. 4-D]. The purchase price was $50,000 payable $10,000 down and
the balance of $40,000 at the rate of $250.00 per
month. The said principal amount drew interest at
the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum. The
plaintiff did not receive any official notice from either
the sellers or the purchasers of the sale. [R. 192-193].
And even though he had heard rumors about a sale,
Mr. Robert Cole, selling agent for Imperial Realty
Company with whom he had listed the BLACKOUT
business, assured him that the landlords through Mr.
McConaughy said there would be no problem renewing the lease agreements. [R. 192-193, 239-241].
The first notice of any kind the plaintiff received
concerning the sale of the real property at 368 South
Main Street, Park City, Utah [R. 192-193], or concerning the desire of the new owner to have the plaintiff remove his property [R. 249] was in the form of
a telephone call from the defendant, Peggy Fitz-
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patrick, sometime during the early part of April,
1973, probably the second week. [R. 243]. Mrs. Fitzpatrick called the plaintiff's laundromat business in
Granger, Utah, and left word with plaintiff's son that
she wanted to talk to the plaintiff. [R. 183]. When
the plaintiff returned the call, Mrs. Fitzpatrick told
him that she represented purchasers of the property
in Park City and asked him if he was aware the bar
business had been closed during the weekend. [R.
183]. The plaintiff said he didn't know the property
had been sold, nor that it had been closed. [R. 183,
242-243]. He said he had been there two or three
days prior to the weekend, and the business had been
fully operating at that time. [R. 183].
Mrs. Fitzpatrick also told the plaintiff at this
time that she wanted him to get his equipment out of
the premises. [R. 183]. When the plaintiff tried to
find out who the new purchasers of the premises were,
Fitzpatrick told him that it was none of his business,
that Mrs. Fitzpatrick was representing them and they
expected him to remove his property. [R. 242-247].
In later telephone conversations, he attempted to find
out who the new landlords were and talk to them
about a renewal of the lease; but Mrs. Fitzpatrick
continued to tell them that the landlords were not
available to talk to him, there was no need for
conversation and he was to move his equipment out
immediately. [R. 242-247]. During this first telephone conversation, the plaintiff told Mrs. Fitzpatrick
that he would get back in touch with her. He then
got in his van and drove immediately to Park City.
9
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[R. 183]. He found the bar was open, the bar was
running with business as usual, customers were in
the place and there was no appearance of any damage
to the premises. [R. 183].
The plaintiff testified he talked to Marvin Ryan
and asked Ryan if anybody had told him about closing up the business or about a sale of the property.
He said Ryan replied he was not aware of any sale
or that the business was supposed to be closed. [R.
189]. Plaintiff told Ryan about the telephone call and
stated to him emphatically plaintiff considered he
was a legal tenant and he had a right to keep the
business operating until the new landlords took whatever action was necessary to get the business stopped.
[R. 189].
The plaintiff testified he called the defendant
Fitzpatrick back the next day and told her the
business was not closed and asked her why she was
calling him about getting his equipment out of the
premises. According to the plaintiff's testimony, Fitzpatrick said, "You are the tenant of record that was
on the lease there," and that she was calling him as
a representative of the new owners. [R. 190]. Fitzpatrick stated again the reason she called him was
because he was a tenant of record on the lease.
[R. 192, 194]. The plaintiff testified he told Fitzpatrick he was indeed the tenant of the property, he
did not wish to move- that he had been assured the
lease would be renewed and he was going to continue
his business at this location. [R. 194]. Fitzpatrick
10
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again emphasized that the plaintiff would have to get
out of the premises. [R. 194].
Plaintiff said he then went back to Park City and
talked to Ryan again and told him to stay on the
premises and not to stop the business. [R. 194]. The
plaintiff testified R3^an told him all of the rent payments had been made for February, March and April,
1973. [R. 194]. The plaintiff himself had made all
the rental payments due to the landlord through the
date of the sale to Ryan on February 1, 1973, and also
had made all of the payments on the bar equipment
through January, 1973. [R. 177].
The plaintiff testified Peggy Fitzpatrick called
him again about two days later and asked him when
he was going to move his equipment out of Park City.
Fie told her he had a going business and would like
to meet with the new owners to negotiate a new lease
on the premises and continue in the building. [R.
195]. He was refused this right. [R. 242-247]. Plaintiff testified he went back to Park City the following
Sunday and the bar was being closed, there was no
business going on and Mr. Ryan was removing his
personal effects. [R. 195-196].
When he asked Ryan why he was closing the
business, Ryan told him the defendant William Lence
who was the Justice of the Peace in Park City told
him to get out of the building. Ryan said Lence stated
unless Ryan vacated the building by that Sunday
evening, Lence was going to proceed with action
11
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against him. Ryan said that since he lived in Park
City and Lence was the Justice of the Peace, he had
no choice but to close the business. [R. 196].
Plaintiff testified since the bar was closed, the
only thing he could do was to try and salvage what
was left; but he could not remove his equipment
immediately because of physical problems with his
eyes which made it difficult to see very well at night.
[R. 196J.
The plaintiff testified the next call he received
was from Peggy Fitzpatrick who told him the locks
had been changed on the building and he would be
allowed to remove his equipment by obtaining keys
which she would leave in businesses near the BLACKOUT. She said the new owners had a contractor
coming to remodel the building; they had another
tenant they wanted to get in the building; and they
wanted the plaintiffs equipment out. [R. 198]. The
plaintiff had not received any legal notice from either
the defendants or from the landlords to vacate the
building and no lawsuit had been commenced to have
him vacate the building at the time Mrs. Fitzpatrick
called him, nor after that time. [R. 192-193, 249].
Peggy Fitzpatrick refused to allow the plaintiff to
remove the back bar or front bar [R. 197-198] as did
Mr. Lence. [R. 257].
The plaintiff testified that he sent his sixteen and
eighteen year old boys with a U-haul type truck to
Park City to remove some of the equipment. He said
12
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the boys removed the equipment over a three to four
day period, but defendant Lence told them they could
not take the back bar nor the front bar. [R. 197-198].
The plaintiff testified that Ryan told him none of the
defendants had given Ryan any notice to close the
bar other than when the Justice of the Peace, William
Lence, told Ryan to get out. [R. 249]. Plaintiff said
when his equipment was moved from the premises,
he did not detect any vandalism damage or excessive
water problems in the premises.
The plaintiff's son, Ric Wangsgard, stated he and
his brother rented an Easy Haul Truck, an eighteen
foot van, and went to Park City to remove the equipment. He said the defendant William Lence drove up
in his Jeep Wagoneer; and he was definitely mad.
He said Mr. Lence had his fists clenched and he was
growling and talking through his teeth. He said that
Lence came up to him with kind of a half smile and
said, " CI bet your dad is pretty pissed off about me
kicking him out of here, or locking him out,' and
then he strolled around a while longer and told me
the back bar wasn't to be removed." [R. 257]. Ross
Wangsgard testified he removed his equipment from
the premises after the locks were changed but not
before. [R. 322T7
The plaintiff testified he tried to sell his equipment over about the next year and one half; and he
received approximately $1,900.00 for the bar equipment which he had purchased for $9,650.00 and the
recreational items which he had brought onto the
13
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property at a cost of $5,000.00. [R. 199-200]. He
stated he lost approximately $200 per month profit
on the recreational items that he had in the business
and prior to the time he sold the bar equipment to
Marvin Ryan he was making a profit of $400 per
month. [R. 202]. He further testified as to the mental
anguish and embarrassment he had experienced because of the forcible entry and wrongful eviction from
the premises. [R. 228]. He stated even after he
removed his equipment, he attempted to work this
matter out with Mrs. Fitzpatrick for an additional
two or three week period of time, but was unable to
do so. [R. 299-230]. Thereafter, he commenced his
lawsuit on June 29, 1973—about one and one-half
months after he removed his equipment from the
business. [R. 229-230].
The defendant William Lence testified that Ryan
closed the business on Sunday, April 15, 1973, and
early Monday morning, April 16, 1973. [R. 278].
He testified that the locks were changed about April
26 or 27th or about ten days after Ryan left the business. [R. 280]. During this ten day period all of
the property in the premises at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah, belonged to the plaintiff.
When Ryan left, he abandoned any interest he had
in the property he was purchasing from the plaintiff.
Lence said he had talked to Mathews about changing
the locks but it was really instructions from Peggy
Fitzpatrick that actually made him do it. [R. 280].
He stated he was an employee of the defendants
Mathews. [R. 282]. On cross-examination by his own
14
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attorney, Mr. Lence stated Peggy Fitzpatrick told
him Ross Wangsgard owned the equipment in the
building such as table and chairs and few things like
that. [R. 282]. He said he (Lence) knew Wangsgard
owned the property when he talked to Marvin Ryan.
[R. 277]. The defendant Lence further testified
Marvin Ryan told him Ryan was renting the premises from Ross Wangsgard. [R. 275]. Lence further
testified Ryan told him he was paying $100 per
month rent to the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard and Ryan
never mentioned he was paying rent to anyone else.
[R. 276].

I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING
THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THEREBY TAKING THE CASE FROM
THE JURY BECAUSE THERE WERE DISPUTED
ISSUES OF FACT REGARDING THE PLAINTIFF'S
LEASEHOLD INTEREST AND STATUS AT THE
TIME OF THE DEFENDANTS' FORCIBLE ENTRY
AND WRONGFUL EVICTION OF PLAINTIFF.
1. What causes of action are involved in the
instant lawsuit? The complaint raises two issues or
causes of action, to-wit: (1) wrongful eviction and
(2) forcible entry. The pleadings are sufficient to establish both causes of action; even though each is not
separately pleaded in separate counts. [Alice Ellefsen
v William Dibblee Roberts,
U. 2d
, 526 P. 2d
912 (1974).] Both of these issues were argued by the
parties at the defendants' motion to dismiss at the
15
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commencement of the first trial on Wednesday, October 9, 1974, [See plaintiff's "Trial Memorandum In
Opposition To Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" (R.
110-11) and especially paragraph two at R. 114, et
sequel; and defendants' "Memorandum of Points and
Authority In Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (R. 2-7) ]. Both of these issues were also raised
at the defendants' motion to dismiss held just before
noon on the second day of trial, November 7th. [R.
216]. And both of these issues were raised by the
defendants in their final motion for summary judgment held on the third day of the trial, [R. 329-331 ] ;
at which time defendants' counsel refers to the forcible entry cause of action as the "statutory" cause of
action and the wrongful eviction cause of action as
the "common law" cause of action. It is clear the
trial judge was considering both of these causes of
action at the time the motion for summary judgment
was made and in fact his written summary judgment
is granted as to both causes of action. [R. 14-15]. Both
of these issues were the subject matter of the plaintiff's requested instructions [R. 36-66] and both will
be considered in this brief.
2. What was the basis for the trial judge's order
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment? Commencing at line 7 on page 335 of the
record, the trial judge discusses his feelings regarding
the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the reasons why he thinks the motion should be
granted. The court states in part as follows:
16
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". . . the Court feels . . . these jurors could
not disagree as to the status of the plaintiff at
the time the overt acts took place on the part
of the defendants, which is claimed amounted
or could have amounted to a lockout or eviction, because of the fact at that point the court
finds [plaintiff] had no status or proprietory
interest in the premises which would give rise
in him to a cause of action for damages against
these defendants.
So the court will dismiss
the matter." [R. 335-3361. [Emphasis added.]
"However, the court does find that the
plaintiff owns the back bar and the front bar,
and as testified to this morning, it was 30 lineal
feet on the front bar and I think 33 on the back
bar, and so that will be timesed by the cost due
for lineal foot, as testified to yesterday by the
expert, and then that will be reduced by 50%,
whatever that turns out to be. That will be the
amount that will either be paid to Mr. Wangsgard by the defendants or if he chooses, he
could have the front and back bars actually in
lieu thereof if they are in fact available and
can be separated from the real property without damaging the real property or the back
bar." [R. 3361. [Emphasis added.]
From the foregoing citation, it appears clear the
trial judge felt the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard did not
have any leasehold interest or status in the real
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah,
at the time the defendants forcibly entered onto the
premises and changed the locks on the door; nor at
the time some two weeks earlier when the local
Justice of the Peace of Park City entered into the
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BLACKOUT business and told Marvin Ryan he would
have to close the business and get his belongings out
of the premises by the coming Sunday evening. This
conduct as well as the threatening telephone calls and
demanding messages from Peggy Fitzpatrick to the
plaintiff Ross Wangsgard were clearly willful,
wanton and malicious and were done without any
written notice to vacate the premises and/or any
legal action being commenced against either Ross
Wangsgard or Marvin Ryan in unlawful detainer or
otherwise. Consequently, the trial judge would be in
error if the plaintiff did in fact have some leasehold
or proprietory interest in the premises superior to the
interest of the defendants.
The action of the trial judge in granting the
defendants' motion to dismiss, is inconsistent with
his prior ruling refusing to grant an identical motion
to dismiss which the defendants made at the commencement of the first trial in October [R. 74-a, 74-b,
118-129]; and is further inconsistent with the refusal
of the trial judge to grant the motion to dismiss made
at approximately 11:30 a.m. on the second day of
the trial November 7, 1974. [R. 205-215].
The plaintiff further submits the trial judge's
summary judgment is inconsistent within itself, [R.
14-15; 355-336], for the following reasons: In paragraph one of the said summary judgment, [R. 14],
the trial judge granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment as to both (1) forcible entry and
(2) wrongful eviction. Yet in paragraph two of the
18
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summary judgment [R. 15] the trial judge admitted
the back bar and the front bar were the sole property
of the plaintiff; and he was entitled to recover the
said items or their reasonable value. By holding the
plaintiff did have his equipment, to-wit: the back bar
and the front bar on the premises at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah, it is inconsistent for the trial
judge to also hold the plaintiff did not have any of his
property on the premises and therefore did not have
any leasehold or proprietory interest in the premises.
This point becomes even more clear when we
examine paragraph 17 of Exhibit 5-P which is the
REAL PROPERTY LEASE. This paragraph provides
as follows:
"17. HOLD OVER: In the event Tenant
shall remain in possession of the leased premises or any part thereof after the expiration of
the term of this Lease without any written
agreement therefore, such holding over shall
constitute a tenancy from month-to-month at
a monthly rental equivalent to the then reasonable rental value of the leased premises but not
less than $175.00 per month." [Emphasis
added.]
It is obvious the back bar and front bar must have
constituted a possession by the plaintiff of "any part"
of the leased premises. Accordingly, the plaintiff by
virtue of paragraph 17 itself, would be entitled to a
tenancy from month-to-month and would have had
a proprietory or leasehold interest in the property
at the time of the wrongful conduct by the defend19
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ants. This would be so even if all the other property
on the premises belonged to someone else; which
point the plaintiff does not concede; since he had not
only the front bar and the back bar on the premises
but also his recreational and amusement machines;
and the bar equipment he was selling to Marvin
Ryan and which Ryan abandoned when the Justice of
the Peace ordered him out.
The trial judge himself appears to have some
reservation about his summary judgment. In addition to having denied the same motion two times
previous, the trial judge recommended an appeal be
taken in this matter in the following language:
"And I may be wrong here. And, Mr.
Mcintosh, be sure that this Court is desirous
of your appealing this thing, so if I am mistaken here or if I have done something prematurally or not completely, I want to be told
by the Supreme Court, and, so don't in any
way think that this court feels, is going to feel
offended, whatever, about an appeal, because
I expect it and I want it" [R. 337, lines 20-26 ] .
[Emphasis added.]
The plaintiff would have appealed the case even without this encouragement from the trial judge; but the
language used by the trial judge shows he had some
doubts about the correctness of his ruling. Such
doubts on a motion for summary judgment should be
enough by themselves to indicate to the trial judge
there were legitimate disputed issues of fact to be
tried by the jury; and this case was not all that clear
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so reasonable minds could not differ. It appears the
trial judge was disposed to grant the plaintiff's proposed jury instructions on this issue and even marked
them as "Given." [R. 41-461. Why he suddenly
changed his mind on the case is a mystery to the
plaintiff.
It is interesting that the very point in issue upon
which the judge decides this case, to-wit: the status of
the plaintiff in the premises at the time the wrongful
conduct of the defendants took place, was the very
issue the trial judge denied the plaintiff the right to
prove. That is, the plaintiff was prohibited from
introducing testimony as to his status and his right to
possession of the premises under either of the written
lease agreements [Exs. 5-P, 6-P, and 7-P] or through
the testimony of the landlord Robert McConaughy or
through plaintiff's own testimony concerning the said
lease documents. It is not clear why the judge refused
to allow the lease documents into evidence nor to
allow the testimony of the former landlords Robert
McConaughy; but the plaintiff submits this Supreme
Court should rule on this matter as a guide for the
admissibility of this testimony in a second trial in
the event this case is remanded for a new trial on all
issues.

3. What was the plaintiff Ross Wangs gardes
interest in the premises at 368 South Main Street,
Park City, Utah, at the time of defendants'
wrongful
conduct? The plaintiff's status as a tenant is reflected
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in the Statement of Facts, supra. He had the following leasehold, proprietory, and possessory interest.
(1) Plaintiff was the tenant described in
all the leasehold document—Exhibits 5-P, 6-P, and
7-P; and the only person entitled to possession of the
premises. Although Gene Mayfield was also named
as a co-tenant in Ex. 7-P, he assigned all of his interest
to the plaintiff in May 1972, [See Exs. 9-P, 11-P,
R. 141-142, 173].
(2) The plaintiff had been assured by Imperial Realty's selling agent, Robert Cole, that the
landlord Robert McConaughy would renew the lease
agreements as soon as he returned from his trip out
of state. [ R. 176, 239-241 ]. So even though the lease
had expired, there was an affirmative statement by
the landlord to renew.
(3) The plaintiff was holding over as a
tenant pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REAL
PROPERTY LEASE. [Ex. 5-PL The initial lease
terms was for a period of five years ending October
31, 1972. All of the parties admit Ross Wangsgard
was the only tenant in the premises during November
and December, 1972, and January, 1973.
(4) After February 1st, 1973, there were
really two businesses being conducted on the leased
premises—one by the plaintiff and one by Marvin
Ryan. The plaintiff was holding over under paragraph 17 of the REAL PROPERTY LEASE because
22
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(1) he had $5,000 worth of recreational and amusement items of his own on the property which he was
not selling to Marvin Ryan, (2) he retained title to
the bar equipment worth $10,000 which he was selling to Marvin Ryan, (3) no other tenant was named
on the Real Property documents, and (4) the landlord Robert McConaughy said he never did have any
oral or written agreement with Marvin Ryan or anyone else to lease the premises other than with Ross
Wangsgard. The plaintiff's business with the recreational items was substantial and he testified in 1971
and 1972 he had earned a profit of $5,000 from these
items as well as $5,000 from the bar equipment sales.
(5) Plaintiff did not assign his leasehold
interest to Marvin Ryan because (1) the lease documents gave the plaintiff the first option to purchase
the property which he considered a valuable property
right, [Ex. 6-P, «J8, R. 193-194] (2) the sale of the
business was tentative only and it would not be
formalized in writing for two to six months and until
Marvin Ryan could get in a sound financial position;
therefore, the plaintiff wanted to wait and see how
Ryan did. If he did poorly, and the plaintiff had to
take back the business, he did not want to have to
renegotiate his position on this lease, (3) plaintiff
was liable anyway since there was no written agreement with the landlord to assign the leasehold interest
to Marvin Ryan, or to remove plaintiff from the
leases as the party primarily responsible, (4) plaintiff
had his own recreational and amusement items worth
$5,000 on part of the leased premises which satisfied
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paragraph 17 of the Real Property Lease for a holdover status on the leased premises "or any part thereof" and (5) he retained title to all of the other
property on the premises which he was selling to
Marvin Ryan.
(6) The plaintiff visited the premises two
to three times each week after February 1, 1973, until
he was wrongfully evicted by the defendants in the
latter part of April, 1973. These visits were to maintain his own recreational and amusement items as
well as to check on the business that he was selling to
Marvin Ryan to be sure that it was not being wasted.
(7) Marvin Ryan defaulted in the monthly payments due on the bar equipment almost immediately and only paid $300 during February,
March, and April, whereas he should have paid $300
per month. Therefore, he was in a default status
and had no interest in the property. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard would be
the only title holder to the property and entitled to
repossess it at any time. This ownership interest together with the fact he visited the business two to
three times weekly, gives Ross Wangsgard a status of
actually possessing the premises; even if he had not
had his recreational amusement items on the
premises.
(8) Marvin Ryan left the BLACKOUT
business on Sunday, April 15, 1973, when he was
ordered out by the local Justice of the Peace, the
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defendant — William Lence. At this time, he abandoned any and all interest he may have had in the
bar equipment. Therefore, for the next ten days until
the locks were changed on April 26 or 27th and thereafter, the only person who had any ownership rights
to the property was the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard.
(9) The defendants Peggy Fitzpatrick and
William Lence both knew that Ross Wangsgard was
the owner of the property and under the lease agreement he was the recognized tenant. This is why
they contacted him about removing the property. The
contact by Peggy Fitzpatrick was before William
Lence even contacted Marvin Ryan and before Ryan
left the premises.
(10) The plaintiff was in the premises
through the subtenant Marvin Ryan who stated to
the defendant William Lence, he, Ryan, was renting
the premises from Ross Wangsgard. [R. 275].
It appears clear the plaintiff had a substantial
leasehold, proprietory, possessory interest in the real
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah,
at the time of the defendants' wrongful conduct. He
was the responsible party on all the real property
agreements Exs. 5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and was holding over
pursuant to paragraph 17 of Exhibit 5-P. The landlords acknowledged the status of Wangsgard as the
tenant they dealt with prior to the sale to defendants
Mathews; and they stated they never did have any
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dealing with Ryan or any oral or written agreement
with Ryan to lease the premises.
4. What was Marvin Ryan's interest in the real
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, at
the time of the defendants' wrongful conduct? Since
Marvin Ryan died in November, 1973, [R. 178] he
did not testify at the trial. However, his status on
the premises is found in the testimony of the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard and the defendant William
Lence. Counsel for defendants waived the hearsay
objections to conversations with Ryan. [R. 186-187].
The plaintiff testified Marvin Ryan had worked
for him and operated the bar for him during December, 1972, and January, 1973. [R. 147-148]. In January, 1973, Mr. Ryan and the plaintiff agreed to the
purchase and sale of the business at a price of $10,000.
[R. 147-148]. The sale didn't include the recreational
or amusement items for which the plaintiff had paid
$5,000 and which he owned in his own name. [R.
146]. Mr. Ryan was to pay the $10,000 for the business at the rate of $300 per month. In addition he
was to pay all utilities and to pay the monthly rental
due under the lease agreements. [R. 181]. Mr. Ryan
was to take possession of the property on February 1,
1973. [R. 177]. The plaintiff did not assign his leasehold interest to Ryan; [R. 180]; although he did in
fact sublease a portion of the premises to Ryan; at
the same time he sold the bar equipment.
Since Ryan didn't pay anything down, the plaintiff retained the title to all the bar equipment until
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the full purchase price was paid. [R. 177, 1781. The
plaintiff testified Mr. Ryan was going to operate the
business for two to six months; and if Ryan could
get in a profitable financial condition, there would be
a formal written contract pertaining to the $10,000
purchase price. [R. 1781. The contract was never
formalized and Ryan died in November, 1973. [R.
1781. Although Ryan should have paid to the plaintiff a total of $900 during February, March and April,
1973; in actuality, he only paid to the plaintiff $300
which consisted of $100 on one occasion and $200
on another occasion. [R. 234-235].
The defendant William Lence testified Ryan told
him he was renting the premises from Ross Wangsgard. [R. 275 ]. Ryan also told Lence Ross Wangsgard
owned the equipment in the building such as a table,
chairs, and a few similar items; and this knowledge
had been conveyed to him, Lence, by Peggy Fitzpatrick, as well as by Ryan himself. [R. 277, 282].
He testified Ryan closed the business on Sunday, April
15th and early Monday morning, April 16, 1973.
[R. 278]. He testified the locks were changed about
April 26 or 27th or about ten days after Ryan left the
business. [R. 280]. During this ten day period, all of
the property in the premises at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah, belonged to the plaintiff.
When Ryan left the premises, it is obvious he abandoned any interest he had in the property he was
purchasing from the plaintiff.
Since the plaintiff had never relinquished his
status as a tenant under the real property leases, and
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since the landlord had no oral agreement or written
agreement to lease the premises to Marvin Ryan, it
is clear the plaintiff is the only one who had any
interest in the leasehold agreements and was the
tenant who was holding over after the expiration of
the lease pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REAL
PROPERTY LEASE. [Ex. 5-P]. When Marvin Ryan
told William Lence he, Ryan, was leasing the property
from Ross Wangsgard, it is clear Ryan understood he
was at most a subtenant de facto; even though the
official written consent of the landlord to said subtenancy had not yet been obtained. It further appears
clear the subtenancy from the plaintiff to Ryan was
for less than the entire area the plaintiff was leasing.
This is so because the plaintiff retained a portion of
the premises for his $5,000 worth of recreational and
amusement items.
It is well settled that a tenant may sublet the
premises in whole or in part; and a lessee need not be
in possession of the demised premises, his right to sublet not being dependent upon his possession. Thus a
lessee may, before entry, make a good sublease. The
only limitation on the right of a lessee to sublet the
premises is they cannot be sublet to be used in a
manner inconsistent with the terms of the original
lease or injurious to the premises. 49 Am. Jur. 2d,
Landlord and Tenant, 470 §481 "Right to Sublet."
A subletting creates a new estate dependent upon
or carved out of but distinct from the original leasehold. When Ross Wangsgard rented a portion of the
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leased premises to Ryan and retained a portion for
Wangsgard's amusement items, Wangsgard in effect
subblet a portion of the premises to Ryan. Imperial
Realty and its agent Robert Cole had assured plaintiff
the landlord would renew the lease with plaintiff
upon the landlord's return from out of State. Therefore there would be no violation of the lease provision
affecting a sublease without the consent of the landlord; since this consent was given. Moreover, it has
been held the courts do not favor such provisions
against subletting since they are in restraint of
alienation. Some courts hold where the lease restricts
the use of the premises to a particular purpose and
provides the lessee shall not sublet the premises for
any other purpose, the lessee may sublet the premises
to be used for the particular authorized purposes.
49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, 473, Part B,
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST SUBLETTING, Section
485 "Generally." It is clear Marvin Ryan was using
the premises for the same purposes Wangsgard had
used them.
Other courts have held that permitting a third
person to enter into the joint occupation of the premises with the lessee is not necessarily a subletting, and
that the fact that a lessee conducting a business on
the demised premises takes a third person into partnership with him and thus lets such third person into
joint possession of the premises is not a breach of
a covenant against subletting, 49 Am. Jur., 2d, Landlord and Tenant, 472 §484 "What Constitutes A Subletting." Consequently, it appears clear, Marvin Ryan
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was at most a subtenant of the lessee Wangsgard.
Wangsgard still remained liable on the original lease
agreements including the holding over provisions and
the landlord would have looked to Wangsgard not
Ryan for any breach of the lease.
5. What was the defendants' interest in the real
property at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah,
at the time of their wrongful conduct? Counsel for
the defendants on the last day of the trial stipulated
and admitted each of the defendants would be bound
by the conduct of any of them because they were
in a common agency with each other. [R. 3261.
The plaintiff submits none of the defendants had
any proprietory or possessory interest in the premises
at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, which was
superior in point of time or in any other way to that
of the plaintiff. Any interest of the defendants must
have come about by virtue of the interest which the
defendants Mathews had in the property. The
defendants Mathews interest in the property came by
virtue of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which they
entered into with the former landlords, Robert McConaughy, et al. [Ex. 4-D]. It is clear from this contract the former landlords retained title to the premises until all of the payments were made. [Ex. 4-D,
§19].
Certainly any sale of the premises would have
to be made subject to any valid leasehold interest
which a tenant had in the premises. Both Fitzpatrick
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and Lence knew the plaintiff owned the equipment
on the premises at the time the locks were changed
and each of them knew he was the party responsible
on the lease. They both assumed the telephone calls
to vacate the premises or the visits to the premises
were all that was necessary. They did not observe
the statutory requirements of notice, lawsuit, etc.
6. Why the defendants' conduct constituted a
wrongful eviction of the plaintiff. In this action the
plaintiff is claiming he was wrongfully evicted from
the premises he was occupying at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah; and that as a sole, direct
and proximate cause of said wrongful eviction he
has sustained certain damages. A wrongful eviction
of a tenant by his landlord may be either an actual
or constructive eviction. Any disturbance of the
tenant's possession by the landlord, or someone acting
under his authority which renders the premises unfit
for occupancy for the purposes for which they were
demised or which deprives the tenant of the beneficial
enjoyment of the premises causing him to abandon
them, amounts to constructive eviction. In this regard, the intention on the part of the landlord to
wrongfully evict the tenant may be indicated by the
acts of the landlord and may be presumed by the
character of the act if the neccessary result of it is
to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of
the premises. The landlord's interference with the
tenant's right of ingress and egress, as by locking the
door of a building, is sufficient to constitute a con31
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structive eviction. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant, Part X, EVICTION; 314 et sequel, Section 301
"Actual or Constructive Eviction," p. 317 Section 302
"Elements and Requisites—Generally; Intention of
Landlord/' p. 323 Section 307 "Interference with Ingress and Egress."
In the instant case, the intention of the defendants to wrongfully evict both the plaintiff and Marvin Ryan is indicated by the action of William Lence
in ordering Marvin Ryan to close the BLACKOUT
business or Lence would take action against him; by
the telephone calls from Peggy Fitzpatrick to Ross
Wangsgard saying the building had been sold, the
new owners would not talk to Wangsgard; that a
contractor was coming to remodel the premises for
a new tenant and that Wangsgard had no choice but
to remove his equipment and get out. It was also
indicated by changing the locks on the building and
by refusing to allow the plaintiff to remove the back
bar and front bar which belonged to him.
A lease of real property from a landlord to a
tenant caries with the lease an implied covenant the
tenant or lessee shall have the quiet and peaceable
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises, so
far as regards the lessor or anyone lawfully claiming
through or under him or anyone asserting title to
the premises superior and paramount to the lessor.
This means the landlord is bound not to do anything
calculated to interfere writh the free and full enjoyment and possession and use of the premises by the
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tenant or lessee. Where there is an interference with,
or interruption of, the peaceable and quiet enjoyment
and possession and use of the premises through
some act or failure to act of the the lessor or landlord,
an action may be maintained based upon the breach
of this implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Any
direct, substantial interference by the landlord, or
by persons acting under his authority, with the actual
possession of the tenant constitutes a breach of this
covenant of quiet enjoyment. 41 A.L.R. 2d 1414,
"Breach of Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment of Lease,"
Section 3, p. 1420, "Implied Covenant In General."
Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 U. 50, 137 P. 2d 819 (1943).
In this case, the defendants contend they are not
liable to the plaintiff for wrongful eviction because
the plaintiff was not in lawful possession of the premises; but had in fact and effect subleased the premises
to Marvin Ryan. This argument overlooks both the
fact that actual possession is not required in the case
of wrongful eviction and the fact that damage to a
subtenant is actionable damage to the tenant. The
right of the lessee or tenant to use and occupy the
demised premises is not, in the absence of restrictions
in the lease, limited to a personal occupation. In the
absence of any such restrictions, the tenant may occupy and use the premises through his agents and
servants, or he may sublet or assign the leased premises so as to confer upon his sublessee or assignee his
right to use or occupancy. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord
and Tenant, p. 248 Section 229 "Duty of Lessee to
Occupy Premises."
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The tenant is under no obligation, in the absence
of specific provisions therefore, to occupy or use or
to continue to use the leased premises; even though
one of the parties or both expected and intended that
they should be used for the particular purpose to
which they seem to be adapted or for which they
seem to be constructed. In other words, making entry
upon or taking possession of a demised premises, is
not a general obligation of a lessee. The lessee's
mere removal from the demised premises does not
entitle the landlord in the absence of some provision
in the lease giving him the right to do so, to enter
onto the premises and terminate the lease, 49 Am.
Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, p. 248 Section 229
"Duty of Lessee to Occupy Premises."
The defendant's contention that Ross Wangsgard
was not in actual possession of the leased premises
misinterprets the scope and degree of the possession
required for wrongful eviction as opposed to forcible
entry. Actual possession is not an element of wrongful eviction although it may be an element of "forcible entry." However, even assuming actual possession is a necessary requirement of "forcible entry"
the plaintiff, Ross Wangsgard, contends he did have
sufficient actual possesion of the leased premises prior
to the unlawful acts of the defendants as stated in
part 3 supra, "What was the plaintiff Ross Wangsgardes interest in the premises at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah, at the time of defendants'
wrongful conduct?"
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Under these facts and circumstances, the plaintiff, Ross Wangsgard, was in fact in lawful actual use
and occupancy of the premises at 368 South Main
Street, Park City, Utah, for more than five days prior
to the time the locks were changed, and for more
than five days prior to the time the defendant Lence
entered the premises and ordered Ryan out threatening legal action if Ryan did not leave. Hargrave v.
Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Paxton v. Fisher,
86 U. 408, 45 P. 2d 903, (1935); Buchanan v. Crites,
106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944); Larsen v. Knight,
120 U. 261, 233 P. 2d 365 (1951); Lambert v. Sine,
123 U. 145, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); King v. Firm, 3 U.
2d419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955);Peterson v. Piatt, 16 U.
2d 220, 400 P. 2d 507 (1965); Freeway Park Building
Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 U.2d 266,
451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Monter v. Kratzers Specialty
Bread Company, 29 U. 2d 18, 504 P. 2d 40 (1972);
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952);
6 A.L.R. 3d 177 "Right of Landlord Legally Entitled
to Possession to Dispossess Tenant Without Legal
Process."
Finally the defendants argue they are not liable
to plaintiff because any damage was to the sublessee
Marvin Ryan and not to the plaintiff. Even assuming
the plaintiff was not conducting any business on the
leased premises and did not have his recreational
items there, the overwhelming weight of authority
is to the effect the landlord is responsible to the tenant
for a wrongful interference by the landlord with the
tenant's sublessee. The interference may be such as
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to be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment or
an eviction as where the landlord might expel the
sublessee. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant,
483 Section 502 "Liability of the Lessor to the Lessee
for Interference;" 70 A.L.R. 1477, "Liability of Landlord for Interferring with Tenants of Lessee.";
Levitzky v. Canning, 33 Calif. 299 (1867); Central
Business College v. Rutherford, 47 Colo. 277, 107 P.
279 (1910); Aste v. Putman's Hotel Co., 247 Mass.
147, 141 NE 666, 31 A.L.R. 149 (1923); New York v.
Mabie, 13 NY 151, 64 Am. Dec. 538 (1855).
When the landlords Mathews and/or their
agents Lence and/or Fitzpatrick interf erred with the
sublessee, Marvin Ryan, to such an extent to constitute a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment to
which the said Marvin Ryan was entitled so as
to constitute a wrongful eviction or a forcible entry
upon the premises occupied by the said Marvin Ryan,
then the landlord and/or their agents would be liable
in civil damages to the tenant Ross Wangsgard for
such interference.
From the Statement of Facts, it is clear the defendants wrongfully evicted Ross Wangsgard and
also his subtenant Marvin Ryan at the time of their
wrongful conduct by threatening Ryan with action
if he did not leave the premises; and by changing
the locks on the doors.
7. Why the defendants' conduct constituted a
forcible entry against the plaintiff. The statutes of
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the State of Utah dealing with forcible entry and
detainer provide as follows:
"78-36-1. 'Forcible Entrf Defined. Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open -doors, windows or
other parts of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth or by any kind of violence or
circumstances of terror, enters upon or into
any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real
property, turns out by force, threats or
menacing conduct the party in actual possession."
In this action, the plaintiff alleges the defendants were guilty of a violation of subsection (1) of
the state statutes when William Lence entered onto
the BLACKOUT premises and then ordered Marvin
Ryan out threatening further legal action if Ryan
did not leave by Sunday night. The plaintiff further
alleges a forcible entry occurred when the defendants
changed the locks on the doors on the premises at
368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and refused
to allow either the plaintiff and/or Marvin Ryan to
continue operating the business on the said premises
after the date the locks were changed.
The plaintiff alleges he satisfied the actual possession requirements of the subsection by virtue of
his leasehold, proprietory, and possessory interest as
set forth in part 3 of this argument entitled "What
was the plaintiff Ross Wangsgard's interest in the
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premises at 368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah,
at the time of defendants9 wrongful conduct?
The plaintiff further submits the word "possession" as used in section 78-36-1(2), U.C.A. - 1953,
is broad enough to include possession by a subtenant
as well as by the plaintiff personally. This position
is taken because of the provisions of section 78-36-3
dealing with unlawful detainer. The latter statute
uses the word possession to mean either "in person
or by subtenant." The plaintiff submits the legislature did not intend to attach any different meaning
to the word possession in subsection 78-36-1 (2); since
both the forcible entry statute and the unlawful
detainer statutes were enacted at the same time.
The forcible entry statute says "every person"
who does certain things is guilty of forcible entry.
There is no exception for one who may by contract
or lease be authorized to enter or for an owner or
landlord who as a matter of law may have right to
possession. Everyone is guilty of a forcible entry who
commits the acts specified. All that an occupant
needs to show in order to be protected by the provisions of this statute, is that he was in peaceful
possession of the land or premises prior to the "forcible entry" by the other party. If the landlord takes
the law into his own hand and turns a tenant in
peaceful possession out by means of force, fraud,
intimidation, stealth or by any kind of violence, he
makes himself liable to that tenant for damages.
Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Whole38
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sale Supply, 22 U. 2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969);
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 U. 408, 415, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935).
The landlord has no right without the tenant's
consent to enter upon the tenant's use and occupancy
of the premises, to use a key to gain entrance to the
premises without the tenant's permission and/or to
change the locks on the doors to the premises without
the tenant's permission. It is clear that even rightful
owners cannot without being civilly liable for their
actions take the law into their own hands by violence
or by entry in the night time or during the absence
of the occupants of any real property. Freeway Park
Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply,
22 U.2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Paxton v. Fisher,
86 U. 408, 415, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935). It appears clear
the defendant entered onto the premises and changed
the locks between April 16-26, when Wangsgard was
temporarily absent and at a time when Lence and
Fitzpatrick both knew the property belonged to
Wangsgard; that he was the tenant in the lease agreements and they had not served him or Ryan with
any notice to quit or vacate the premises or commenced any legal action to accomplish same; and at
a time when they knew Wangsgard was claiming his
leasehold rights to continue in business.
Insofar as the forcible entry statutes are concerned, "peaceful possession" may exist without
occupancy as where a man's servant is in actual
possession of the property and is holding possession
for him. A partes possession continues
notwith39
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standing the presence of other persons or their property on the land provided they hold in subordination to the tenants rights and not as independent
claimants or possessors.
In this case, the possession of the plaintiff Ross
Wangsgard continued on the premises at 368 South
Main Street, Park City, Utah ,even though Marvin
Ryan was also on or in the property. This would be
so because Marvin Ryan's claim to the use and occupancy of the premises was subordinate to Ross Wangsgard's right and was dependent upon whatever rights
Ross Wangsgard had. Marvin Ryan did not have any
independent claim or possessory right with the landlord separate and apart from the right which Ross
Wangsgard held. The landlords testified they had
no oral or written agreement with Ryan to lease the
BLACKOUT premises and Ryan told defendant Lence
he was renting the premises from Wangsgard.
To constitute peaceful possession as contemplated by the forcible entry statutes, it is not necessary the party be personally present on the premises
at the time of the offense; if he is in actual exercise
of authority and control over them. Generally speaking, the actual possession which is sufficient consists
in exercising acts of dominion over the land in
dispute and making the ordinary use of it and may
consist in, and may be shown by, a great number and
combination of acts, the character of which may
necessarily vary with the situation of the parties,
the character of the land, and the purpose to which
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it is adapted. 35 Am. Jur. 2d, Forcible Entry and
Detainer^ 901 Section 15 "Character and Sufficiency
of Possession" and Section 16 "Exclusiveness of
Possession/' 36A CJ.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer
1084 Section 111 "Nature and Elements of
Offense, and p. 970 Section 10 "Character of Possession in General."
The law in Utah is clear if the defendants or
either of them did enter upon the premises at 368
South Main Street, Park Citj^ Utah and order the
plaintiff and Ryan out with threats of action or if
they changed the locks on the doors to the premises
without the consent of Ross Wangsgard and without
complying with the state statutes as to the giving
of proper notice and obtaining a valid court order
allowing the defendants to take possession, these acts
would be sufficient to find the defendants had violated the provisions of the forcible entry statutes of
the State of Utah. In this connection, the changing
of the locks on the door without the tenant's permission would be sufficient force and/or sufficient
conduct as contemplated by the statute. Buchanan v.
Crites, 106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944).
The defendants raise as a defense the fact the
plaintiff was permitted to remove his equipment
from the premises after the locks were changed and
therefore was not damaged. The fact that Ross
Wangsgard may have removed his property from the
premises after the locks were changed is not material
and would not constitute a defense to the charge of
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either "wrongful eviction" and/or "forcible entry."
35 Am. Jur. 2, Forcible Entry and Detainer, 920
Section 42 "Defenses."
Furthermore, the damages the plaintiff alleges
he sustained are not merely the loss of the sale of
the business to Marvin Ryan but also the loss of
$200 net monthly profit from his own recreational
items and the mental anguish he experienced which
clearly are elements of damage in either wrongful
eviction or forcible entry. 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, 339 Section 323 "Damages for
Wrongful Eviction, Measure and Elements Generally"; p. 341 Section 326 "Injuries to Business; Lost
Profits"; p. 342 Section 327 "Physical Injury and
Mental Anguish"; 17 A.L.R. 2d 936 "Recovery by
Tenants of Damage for Physical Injuries or Mental
Anguish Occasioned by Wrongful Eviction"; Hargrave v. Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Lambert v. Sine, 123 U. 137, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); Peterson v. Piatt, 16 U. 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965); Perkins
v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952); Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wholesale
Supply, 22 U. 2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969).
It is clear in the State of Utah, a landlord who
is entitled to possession of certain premises must, on
refusal of the tenant to surrender the premises, resort
to the remedies given by law to secure it. If the landlord, contrary to the terms of the Utah Statutes enters
by force without resort to legal process, he is by
statute made civilly liable to the disposed tenant.
42
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In this case, even if the tenant, Ross Wangsgard,
and/or Marvin Ryan, were behind in the payment
of their rent and even though the lease had expired
and even though the lease contains a provision permitting the landlord to re-enter the leased premises
and take possession of same upon default of the
tenant and even though the lease may have been
breached in other ways such as subletting, etc., the
landlord has no right to deprive the tenant of the
possession of his premises without taking the legal
steps that are required by law.
These legal steps include, among other things,
a proper notice to the tenant to vacate the premises
and a court order ordering or permitting the landlord
to retake physical possession of the property in question. The tenant who is entitled to the protection of
this process and these steps is the tenant who has the
responsibility under the lease to the landlord which
in this case would be Ross Wangsgard. Hargrove v.
Leigh, 73 U. 178, 273 P. 298 (1928); Paxton v. Fisher,
86 U. 408, 45 P. 2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. Crites,
106 U. 428, 150 P. 2d 100 (1944); Larsen v. Knight,
120 U. 261, 233 P. 2d 365 (1951); Lambert v. Sine,
123 U. 145, 256 P. 2d 241 (1953); King v. Firm, 3 U.
2d 419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955); Peterson v. Piatt, 16
U. 2d 330, 400 P. 2d 507 (1965); Freeway Park Building Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 22 U.
2d 266, 451 P. 2d 778 (1969); Monter v. Kratzers
Specialty Bread Company, 29 U. 2d 18, 504 P. 2d 40
(1972); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P. 2d
446 (1952); 6 A.L.R.3d 177 "Right of Landlord
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Legally Entitled to Possession to Dispossess Tenant
Without Legal Process."
Neither Ross Wangsgard nor Marvin Ryan gave
their consent and permission to the defendants or
any of them to change the locks on the premises at
368 South Main Street, Park City, Utah, and/or to
re-enter and take possession of the said premises at
that address.
Insofar as the proper notice which a landlord
must give to the tenant to vacate the property is
concerned, Section 78-36-3(2) Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, provides when a tenant has leased
real property for an indefinite time with monthly
rent reserved, he is entitled to a notice requiring him
to quit the premises at the expiration of such month
and this notice must be served upon him fifteen days
or more prior to the end of the month.
And even though the REAL PROPERTY LEASE
[Ex. 5-P] terminated on October 31, 1972, paragraph 17 in the said lease continues the tenancy on
a month-to-month basis. This paragraph provides
as follows:
"17. HOLDOVER: In the event tenants shall
remain in possession of the leased premises
or any part thereof after the expiration of
the term of this lease without any written
agreement, such holding over shall constitute
a tenancy for month to month at a monthly
rental equivalent to the then reasonable
rental value of the leased premises but not less
than $175.00 per month."
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This provision of the lease means when the tenant
Ross Wangsgard remained in possesion of the leased
premises after October 31, 1972, without any written
agreement therefore, he became a tenant from
month to month and he would be entitled to the
protection of the provisions of Section 78-36-3(2)
cited above.
None of the defendants in this action, complied
with Section 78-36-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
dealing with notice and each of them are therefore
guilty of both a "wrongful eviction" of the tenant
Ross Wangsgard and were guilty of a "forcible entry"
upon the premises being occupied by the said Ross
Wangsgard as those terms "wrongful eviction"
and/or "forcible entry" are discussed hereinabove
in the brief. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P.
2d 446 (1952); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant,
93-94 Section 1206 "Notice to Quit - Form, Certainty, and Sufficiency; Notice in the Alternative to
Pay Back Rent or to Quit."

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the appellant
respectfully submits this Honorable Supreme Court
should do the following: (1) reverse the decision of
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow in granting the
respondents' motion for summary judgment, (2) find
and so order that all respondents were guilty of both
a forcible entry and wrongful eviction of the appel45
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lant Ross Wangsgard, (3) remand this case for a
new trial on the issues of damages only, and (4) in
the event this court remands the entire case for a
new trial on all issues then the appellant also requests
a ruling from this court as to the admissibility of
certain real property leasehold agreements Exs. 5-P,
6-P, and 7-P and as to the testimony from the landlord.
Respectfully submitted
McINTOSH & ROBERTSON

I

<y

/ JAMES A. MCINTOSH

A ttorneys for A ppellant
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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